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Abstract  
Human microbiome research makes causal connections between entire microbial communities 
and a wide array of traits that range from physiological diseases to psychological states. To 
evaluate these causal claims, we first examine a well-known single-microbe causal explanation: 
of Helicobacter pylori causing ulcers. This apparently straightforward causal explanation is not 
so simple, however. It does not achieve a key explanatory standard in microbiology, of Koch’s 
postulates, which rely on manipulations of single-microorganism cultures to infer causal 
relationships to disease. When Koch’s postulates are framed by an interventionist causal 
framework, it is clearer what the H. pylori explanation achieves and where its explanatory 
strengths lie. After assessing this ‘simple’, single-microbe case, we apply the interventionist 
framework to two key areas of microbiome research, in which obesity and mental health states 
are purportedly explained by microbiomes. Despite the experimental data available, 
interventionist criteria for explanation show that many of the causal claims generated by 
microbiome research are weak or misleading. We focus on the stability, specificity and 
proportionality of proposed microbiome causal explanations, and evaluate how effectively these 
dimensions of causal explanation are achieved in some promising avenues of research. We 
suggest some conceptual and explanatory strategies to improve how causal claims about 
microbiomes are made. 
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Microbiome research is a new molecular field of study that examines microbial communities 
(‘microbiota’, aka ‘microbiomes’) in host organisms. The field is particularly well-known for its 
insights into the human gut microbiome and its alleged impact on a huge variety of human 
health and disease states. As ever more associations are made between microbiomes and the 
states of their hosts, numerous researchers and commentators have proclaimed that a 
‘microbiome revolution’ is revising everything we know about humans and the biological world 
around and inside us (e.g., Blaser 2014; Mayer et al. 2014; Rees et al. 2018). Such sentiments 
have spread far beyond microbiology and other scientific endeavours to popular and social 
media, where microbiomes are touted as controlling and optimizing all aspects of physical 
wellbeing (including sporting prowess), mental health, and human evolution.1 More recently, 
microbiome research has begun to attract philosophical attention (e.g., Huss 2014; O’Malley and 
Skillings 2018). A philosophical theme of central importance to this research is how health and 
disease states are explained by microbiomes, and how those explanatory claims are evaluated.  
The main activity in human microbiome research today continues to be identifying 
bioinformatic associations between microbiome compositions and numerous diseases. To 
strengthen discoveries of apparently meaningful associations, researchers carry out whole-
community experiments. These manipulations are often framed as showing that entire microbial 
communities are a major causal factor in the production as well as treatment of diseases and 
disorders that range from obesity to anxiety. ‘Emergent properties’ of whole microbiomes are 
sometimes argued to explain these negative and positive effects (e.g., Hall et al. 2018). 
Particularly when whole-microbiome experiments are used to investigate mental health states 
and general brain function, their apparent success has led to claims about the microbiome being 
a locus of control for human behaviour and psychology. From mental illness to social 
preferences, the microbiome is apparently exerting ‘microbial mind control’ (Sampson and 
Mazmanian 2015:565). If this were truly the case, it would raise major questions about personal 
identity and free will. For instance, who or what is in charge of our emotions, behaviours and 
abilities? Does our microbiome define our ‘self’ (Rees et al. 2018; Parke et al. 2018)?  
Tantalizing as such claims and questions are, we believe that before even considering them, far 
more fundamental issues need to be addressed. Our aim is to examine whether existing 
experimental evidence and methodology in microbiome research support basic claims about 
microbiome causality in human hosts. We argue that in many cases, they do not. Our focus is on 
the structure and dimensions of causal explanations in microbiome research, and whether they 
are good causal explanations. We examine candidate explanations by drawing on two traditional 
methods for establishing causation in microbiology and experimental science more generally: 
Koch’s postulates and interventionist views of causation.  
We first discuss a classic example of causal explanation in microbiology: Helicobacter pylori 
and ulcers. A clear contrast between this case and contemporary microbiome explanations is that 
the latter refer to large communities of hundreds of microbial species, while traditional 
microbiological explanations focus on single species. A ‘simple’ textbook case of microbial 
causation is a good starting point, before taking on the complexities of microbiome 
explanations.2 As we will see, even this textbook case is far from straightforward. 
 
                                               
1 E.g., https://www.viome.com/services/; https://www.the-scientist.com/notebook/athletes-microbiomes-differ-
from-nonathletes-31428; https://kellybroganmd.com/depression-starts-in-your-gut/; 
https://www.marsvenus.com/blog/john-gray/staying-happy-with-a-healthy-microbiome (accessed October 2018). 
2 We are grateful to John Matthewson for suggesting this comparison. 






A textbook case of microbial causation: Helicobacter pylori as the cause of peptic ulcers 
The discovery of H. pylori is a well-known exemplar of how a novel but strong causal 
explanation can overthrow scientific orthodoxy. This story begins in the 1980s with 
observations of an unknown microorganism in the stomachs of patients with ulcers. A narrative 
highpoint occurs when one of the key experimenters drinks a culture of H. pylori and rapidly 
experiences stomach problems. After managing to cure himself, he and his colleague go on to 
convince the medical community of an indisputable causal link between the bacterium and 
ulcers, due to the disease being cured by antibiotics. Eventually, both researchers are awarded 
the Nobel Prize for their findings. Their research is a classic success story for establishing causal 
explanations in microbiology (Blaser 1996; Malfertheimer et al. 2014).  
However, when this narrative is put under the microscope, a much more complicated story of 
causality emerges. Standard methods used to establish causality in microbiology are not 
achieved fully. Asymptomatic infections of H. pylori are more common than ulcer-producing 
infections, because background factors play a role in determining whether infections result in 
ulcers or not. The causal pathways and mechanisms of ulcer production are also contested. 
Nevertheless, the key intervention of wiping out H. pylori with antibiotics is taken by many 
scientists, clinicians and physicians as the ultimate justification for causal claims about ulcers. 
The role of bacteria in ulcer production had been suggested as early as the late nineteenth 
century but was largely dismissed in the middle of the twentieth century (Kidd and Modlin 
1998). Bacteria were believed to be unable to inhabit the harsh acidic environment of the 
stomach. Instead, excess acid secretion in the stomach was considered the primary cause of 
ulcer formation. This explanation and associated interventions were not entirely satisfactory, 
because the primary treatment, acid reduction drugs, at best controlled ulcers rather than healing 
them.  
 
The dominant explanation was overthrown by the research efforts of a pair of Australian 
scientists, Robin Warren and Barry Marshall, the latter of whom famously experimented on 
himself. He drank a culture of H. pylori and developed gastritis (Marshall et al. 1985), an 
inflammatory condition of the stomach lining that can lead to ulcer development. Medical and 
scientific literature recognize this ‘auto-experiment’, and the associated body of research results, 
as discovering the principal cause of peptic ulcers and rejecting acid production as the primary 
intervention target (e.g., Ford and Talley 2009; Malfertheiner et al. 2014). Yet, even in the 
heyday of this explanation’s acceptance, there was dissent about whether H. pylori was 
conclusively shown to cause peptic ulcers (e.g., van Zanten and Sherman 1994). 
 
Evaluating Warren and Marshall’s claims requires some background on explanation in 
microbiology. From the late nineteenth century until recently, the gold standard for identifying 
microbial causes required the use of Koch’s postulates (named for microbiologist Robert Koch 
who played a key role in their formulation). These are procedures that establish whether or not a 
microorganism has caused a disease. Although there are some historical vagaries in their exact 
wording, commonly they are presented in three steps (see Gillies 2016 for a four-step 
formulation, and Carter 2003 for five): 
 
1. The microorganism is detected in all disease cases; 
2. The microorganism does not occur in other diseases or non-pathogenically;  
3. After being fully isolated and repeatedly grown in pure culture, the microorganism can 
induce the disease by being introduced into a healthy animal host. 
 






Experimentally, the key step is the third one, and as we will see, it is central to understanding 
causation and what constitutes an adequate experimental intervention. In the H. pylori story this 
postulate is not strictly fulfilled, with Marshall himself acting as the only animal host to which 
the microorganism was introduced (and he did not develop ulcers). Even Koch, when confronted 
with difficulties in carrying out a laboratory-based experiment in the case of cholera, drew on a 
‘natural experiment’ of a cholera epidemic to substitute for his third postulate (Ross and 
Woodward 2016; Gillies 2016). This ‘natural experiment’ served as an experimental proxy, in 
which the absence of the microorganisms from the disease context resulted in a lack of 
observable effect. In short, the reasoning is that ‘if the cause is removed, the effect is taken 
away’ (Gillies 2016:12). This interpretation is also invoked in the H. pylori case.   
 
What did Warren and Marshall do? They took biopsies from patient stomachs and cultured the 
only organism apparently growing there. This was a novel organism, a slightly spiral bacterium 
with a few flagella at one end, first thought to be a Campylobacter, then later given a new genus 
name, Helicobacter (Goodwin et al. 1989). Patient symptoms were then correlated with bacterial 
presence. 100% of duodenal ulcer patients and 75% of gastric ulcer patients had H. pylori. More 
generally, the bacterium was associated with gastritis (Marshall and Warren 1984; Marshall 
2005). 
 
Even though the researchers knew ‘cause-and-effect cannot be proved in a study of this kind’ 
(Marshall and Warren 1984:1314), Marshall, like Koch, thought he could ‘extrapolate 
backwards’. He postulated that if he could eliminate the bacteria, he would also cure duodenal 
ulcers and perhaps gastric ones (Marshall 2005:262). Otherwise he feared that H. pylori would 
be seen as only spuriously associated with ulcers and gastritis. Various antibiotics and 
antibacterials were tried out on culture plates and in patients. The results were good. Cultures on 
plates were severely inhibited in the treatment zone. Four patients treated with a combination of 
antibiotics and an antibacterial were cured without recurrence (single antibiotic interventions 
were and are not successful). Eliminating H. pylori in this limited patient sample appeared to be 
a far more effective long-term treatment for ulcers than conventional stomach acid inhibitors 
(Marshall 2005).  
 
Early papers on this new bacterium and its role in gastric disease invoked Koch’s postulates to 
make causal claims about the association (e.g., Marshall et al. 1985). But at several points 
subsequently, even as he accepted the Nobel Prize in 2005 for his role in the research, Marshall 
admitted that three decades more work on H. pylori had not led to Koch’s postulates being 
fulfilled (Marshall 1995; 2005). Part of the problem was the lack of a non-human animal model. 
Despite colonizing other animal species, Helicobacter did not initially produce ulcers or even 
gastritis in non-humans.3 For ethical reasons, the infection and ulcers especially cannot be 
established in healthy humans, which would be required to fulfil Postulate Three without a non-
human animal model.  
 
That is why Marshall decided to self-experiment. But crucially, he did not go on to develop an 
ulcer. He developed gastritis. Gastritis can lead to ulcer formation, but not all gastritis leads to 
ulcers, nor even most gastritis. On top of that, his gastritis symptoms all abated rapidly, prior to 
any treatment intervention (Marshall et al. 1985).  
 
Marshall himself noted later that the complexities of ulcer formation might be too hard to 
capture in any animal model. ‘In any case, the pressing need for such an effort may have 
                                               
3 Although some animals—especially gerbils—now model gastric symptoms concomitant with H. pylori infections, 
they are argued to be ‘inadequate’ models because H. pylori alone cannot produce human-like symptoms (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2007). 






passed’, he suggested, once there were straightforward diagnostic tools and H. pylori therapies 
(1995:568). In other words, he concluded that Koch’s postulates are useful when there is 
uncertainty, but once something works as a treatment, the pressure is off to establish causality in 
the standard way.  
 
Causal explanation and interventionist dimensions 
The H. pylori case illustrates that there is more to establishing good causal explanations in 
microbiology than straightforward reliance on Koch’s postulates. Although this methodological 
framework has had many successes in the history of microbiology, it is likely that each success 
story will have ambiguities and complications that require additional strategies for examining 
causal claims. Recently, an interventionist account of causation has taken hold in philosophy of 
science, particularly the philosophy of biology (Woodward 2010). On a broad-stroke view of 
this account, cause-effect relationships are demonstrated by showing that interventions on the 
putative cause produce changes in the effect (Woodward 2003). Experimental manipulations are 
a paradigm case of interventions. The interventionist understanding of causation is precisely 
what researchers are looking for when they attempt to establish causal explanations in an 
experimental setting, such as the case of ulcer formation.  
Applying this account to the ulcer case illustrates why the H. pylori explanation supplanted the 
received view of acid as a primary cause. Intervening on H. pylori using antibiotics and 
antibacterials successfully cures ulcers. This is in contrast to intervening exclusively on acid 
production, which at best controls the symptoms of ulcers. Interventionism is therefore a good 
framework for understanding why H. pylori provided a more successful treatment outcome. It is 
important to note, however, that acid production is causally influenced by H. pylori, and so they 
are not independent causal factors. Moreover, the causal chain linking them both to ulcer 
formation is complex, and in the case of duodenal ulcers is still contested (see Ford and Talley 
2009; Hobsley et al. 2009).  
 
In addition to providing criteria for causation in line with scientific practice (Woodward 2003), 
interventionism provides tools for evaluating the strength of causal explanations. The 
framework identifies dimensions that match intuitive scientific ideas about ‘good’ or ‘strong’ 
causal explanations (Box 1). These dimensions can also be applied to what we have learned 
about H. pylori explanations of ulcers. 
 








Recent work has helpfully linked interventionist criteria to Koch’s postulates. Ross and 
Woodward (2016) emphasize that Koch’s postulates involve claims about the specificity of 
causal relationships. Specificity is concerned with the tightness of the cause-effect link, and can 
be understood in two ways. The first is the extent to which a cause has fine-grained control or 
influence over its effect: variations in a cause’s states produce corresponding variations in its 
effect’s states. Explanations that feature causal relationships with higher specificity in this sense 
are thought to be better explanations than those that feature causal relationships with lower 
specificity (Box 1).4 
The second sense of specificity refers to how closely the cause-effect relationship approximates 
one-to-one mapping (Woodward 2010). It is in this sense that Ross and Woodward argue that 
Koch’s Postulate One is akin to ‘specificity of the cause’, in which microorganisms of a given 
type are the only causes of a disease. Postulate Two captures ‘specificity of the effect’, in which 
the microorganism does not cause any other kinds of disease. Combined, these two aspects of 
the cause-effect relationship achieve ‘one-to-one’ mapping of cause to effect.  
The explanation of excess acid causing ulcers does not score well on this dimension of causal 
specificity. Peptic ulcers encompass two types: duodenal and gastric. While duodenal ulcers are 
consistently associated with an increase in acid production, the story is more complicated for 
gastric ulcers, where acid secretion decreases (Kusters et al. 2006; Malfertheimer et al. 2009). 
The acid explanation thus fails the ‘specificity of the cause’, which would require excess acid 
secretion to be present in every case of the disease (gastric and duodenal).  
H. pylori, however, is associated with both duodenal and gastric ulcers. Does it meet the 
specificity criterion? H. pylori’s causal role in ulcer production is also limited in specificity but 
for different reasons. It is well-known that most infections of H. pylori are asymptomatic 
(Graham et al. 2009), which means the bacterial explanation fails the ‘specificity of the cause’ 
condition in Postulate One. A further complication is that some ulcers form without any host 
exposure to H. pylori or even to the alternative known cause of ulcers, anti-inflammatory drugs 
(McColl et al. 1993). H. pylori thus fails the ‘specificity of the effect’ condition of Postulate 
Two. Combining both failures of specificity means that having an ulcer is not diagnostic of an 
                                               
4 Typically, more distal causes will have less specificity than more proximate ones, simply because the longer a 
causal chain, the more associated causes would need to be mapped to unique values of the effect. 
Box 1: Interventionist dimensions of causal explanation 
Specificity (1): The extent to which a cause has fine-grained control over an effect. Variations 
in the states of a cause will produce corresponding variations in particular states of its effect 
(Woodward 2010; Griffiths et al. 2015; Calcott 2017). 
Specificity (2): The degree to which the causal relationship approximates a one-to-one 
mapping: i.e., the cause does not result in other outcomes, and the effect is not produced by 
other causes (Woodward 2010; Ross and Woodward 2016). 
Stability: The extent to which a causal relationship is maintained over a large range of 
background conditions (Woodward 2010 
Proportionality (1): The most appropriate cause and effect variables are selected from a causal 
chain (Kendler 2005; Pocheville et al. 2017).  
Proportionality (2): The causal relationship is described neither too broadly (including 
irrelevant information), nor too narrowly (excluding relevant information) (Yablo 1992; 
Woodward 2010; Pocheville et al. 2017). 






H. pylori infection, and having an H. pylori infection does not mean you have or will get an 
ulcer.5  
Koch’s postulates can also be connected to other interventionist dimensions of explanatory 
strength (Box 1). Stability reflects how sensitive a causal relationship is to background factors, 
and is sometimes referred to as explanatory ‘robustness’ (e.g., Woodward 2006). Difficulties in 
reproducing experimental findings may result from the low stability of a focal causal 
relationship. If repeating an experimental manipulation in a slightly new background does not 
reliably produce the same outcome, the original causal explanation is deemed unstable.6 Clinical 
trials are held to this kind of standard: a causal relationship between a treatment and an outcome 
is confirmed only if it is shown to hold across a range of different genetic, physiological and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Postulate Three, which stipulates that the disease can be induced 
by the same pathogen in different organisms (including other species), can also be interpreted as 
requiring stability of the causal relationship in different background conditions. 
 
Stability is problematic in the H. pylori case. Infection rates vary across continents and 
countries, with currently low rates in Oceania (24%) and high rates in Africa (70%) (Hooi et al. 
2017). In Western countries, only 20% of infected people will develop an ulcer. Although strain 
differences in H. pylori are often mooted as the difference-maker for pathologic outcomes (some 
strains being more virulent), this has limited evidential support due to high variation among H. 
pylori strains and at best modest associations between particular strains and disease (Lin and 
Koskella 2014). Instead, regional diets interact causally with H. pylori infections to determine 
disease outcomes in groups of infected humans (Graham et al. 2009). This suggests a failure of 
stability. The relationship between the microorganism and disease outcome depends upon 
particular background factors, which in this case involve diet.  
Stable relationships generate better causal explanations because they are generalizable to more 
situations (Mitchell 2000; Woodward 2010). A focus on stability may explain why some 
researchers argue that ‘[c]olonization with H. pylori is not a disease in itself but a condition that 
affects the relative risk of developing various clinical disorders of the upper gastrointestinal 
tract’ (Kusters et al. 2006:458). These authors go on to suggest that the pathology of H. pylori 
infections is not caused by ‘direct bacterial activity’, but by the general response of the human 
immune system. This explanation obviously scores very well on stability, because of how 
general the immune response is. But its very broadness raises another explanatory issue. 
Human immune responses do not score well explanatorily in terms of the third interventionist 
dimension of proportionality. Proportionality generally refers to the most appropriate level of 
description of a cause, and like stability, it can be further broken down into two types 
(Pocheville et al. 2017). The first focuses on which cause is selected along a causal chain. Any 
causal variable of interest will produce a series of effects, and any given effect will be produced 
by a chain of causes. Often, more distal causes and effects are less proportionate explanations 
compared to proximate ones. For example, historical and more recent hypotheses about ulcers 
argue that stress is at least as important a causal factor as acid secretion and H. pylori (e.g., 
Levenstein et al. 2015). But even if stress is implicated in the causal chain to ulcers, it has a 
                                               
5 These issues point to a possible interpretation of Koch’s postulates as being about necessary and sufficient 
conditions. While they are sometimes interpreted this way (e.g., Susser 1991), this is not what is claimed under an 
interventionist account of the postulates (Ross and Woodward 2016). 
6 Stability is also related to proximity. The more proximal a pair of cause and effect variables, the fewer causal 
links or steps between them. The fewer causal links there are, the fewer background conditions (per causal link) can 
perturb the total causal relationship. Generally, therefore, distal causal relationships are considered less stable than 
proximal ones (Woodward, 2010:294).  






distal role that initiates a series of more proximate physiological responses. Some of these 
responses would be relevant to ulcer formation, such as an increase in acid secretion, but stress 
would also produce other phenotypes (e.g., stress hormones and their immune and nervous 
system effects). A distal factor, such as stress, often means a more complicated causal pathway 
to the effect, due to interactions with other contributing causes.7 Accordingly, acid secretion 
generates a more proportional causal explanation than stress, and this proportionality is the 
reason for the former’s dominance prior to the H. pylori findings. 
  
The second sense of proportionality looks at how narrowly or broadly a cause or an effect 
variable is described. If a description is too narrow in scope then it excludes other important 
factors in bringing about the effect; if it is too broad, it will include factors that are irrelevant to 
the production of the effect. This sense of proportionality can often involve a trade-off with 
stability. Causes that are stably associated with effects, such as the human immune response 
discussed above, lack explanatory power due to their disproportionately broad scope and 
irrelevant information. Immune responses refer to a heterogeneous range of factors that are 
causally implicated in a large range of different effects. Though less broad than the immune 
response, acid production is also a disproportionately broad cause compared to H. pylori 
because of the different pathways to gastric and duodenal ulcers, and acid secretion’s causal 
influence on other phenotypes.8  
 
A major reason why many researchers see the relationship between H. pylori and ulcers as 
paradigmatically causal is because the explanation generated successful treatment outcomes. 
Intervening on H. pylori is a successful way to get rid of ulcers. Just as for Koch’s own analysis 
of cholera, the elimination of ulcers via the elimination of H. pylori seals an inference of 
causation: ‘The ultimate proof of H. pylori as the main cause of ulcer disease was the permanent 
cure of peptic ulcers by eradication of the infection’ (Malfertheiner et al. 2009:1450).  
 
In sum, although the H. pylori explanation of ulcers is weak on the specificity and stability 
dimensions, it fits an interventionist account of causation better than alternative explanations, 
and scores higher on proportionality.  
 
The broader message here is that the causal story linking H. pylori to ulcers is much more 
complicated than the standard textbook version (Thagard 1998).9 Given that H. pylori is merely 
a single microbe, how well will microbiome explanations of host states fare? Unlike the H. 
pylori case, most microbiome research has not yet resulted in successful treatment regimes for 
human disease. This gap suggests that causal claims about the microbiome’s role in human 
disease and mental states require careful assessment with causal criteria.  
                                               
7 Note that this sense of proportionality can apply to both the selection of causes and effects. Whether or not 
proportionality is used to select causes or effects depends upon the explanatory project: whether it is focused on 
explaining what causes an outcome, or on explaining what kinds of outcomes are produced by a particular factor. 
When selecting the most appropriate effect, proximity is also a good indicator of proportionality. This is because 
proximate effects often encompass the entire causal output, whereas more distal effects are parsed into different 
variables, some of which have other contributing causes influencing them.  
 
8 This sense of proportionality can also be applied to both causes and effects, again depending on the explanatory 
project. When trying to understand the effects of a particular factor, effects may be invoked that are inappropriately 
broad or narrow, such as claiming that H. pylori causes illness, rather than more exactly ulcers. 
 
9 Philosopher Paul Thagard (1998) has long argued that the interacting causal factors in the H. pylori-ulcer 
explanation make a ‘causal network’ explanation more effective than a single-cause explanation. 






The microbiome ‘revolution’ 
Contemporary microbiome researchers look for microbial causality rather differently from 
classic microbiology, which focuses on single microbes that can be investigated within the 
framework provided by Koch’s postulates. However, the aim of microbiome research in human 
hosts is similar: to establish whether microbiomes are causally responsible for particular health 
and disease states. Standard microbiome investigations start with DNA extraction from a sample 
of all the microorganisms in a specified environment (including the human gut). The DNA is 
sequenced and then analysed computationally. Sophisticated bioinformatic methods analyse this 
mixed-species DNA sequence to find compositional patterns. These microbiome patterns can 
then be associated with particular host states, such as diseases and disorders. When associations 
seem strong, experimental efforts are brought to bear on the relationship. We assess two such 
cases. The first attempts to link microbiomes to obesity and the second to mental health 
disorders. But first we address an important question: What is the microbiome, anyway? This is 
crucial to understanding how microbiomes are meant to work causally.  
 
What is the microbiome?  
There are at least four different ways to characterize microbiomes, which we conceptualize as 
‘compositional’, ‘functional’, ‘outcome-oriented’, and ‘causal core’ microbiomes. In many 
cases, including those of obesity and mental health, characterizations vary and the nature of the 
‘microbiome’ being manipulated is not clear.   
Generally speaking, any microbiome is a complex entity of multiple interacting components. 
Human gut microbiomes consist of around 40 trillion organisms that can be sorted into at least 
1000 species-like groups (Sender et al. 2016). The microbiome is often first characterized 
compositionally in attempts to identify these taxa and their relative proportions. When 
characterized compositionally, host-associated microbiomes differ extensively within human 
populations, and within individual human hosts over time (Human Microbiome Project 
Consortium 2012).  
However, there is often much more similarity across human microbiomes when understood at a 
functional level. Functions are usually assessed in terms of biochemical pathways, and it is these 
pathways that produce phenotypic effects. Metabolic pathways are a common focus here: the 
functional microbiome is understood on the basis of all of the metabolic pathways and products 
of the microbiota. But because experimental biochemistry is rarely carried out with microbiome 
members, functions are typically inferred from genes in the microbiome sequence (Manor and 
Borenstein 2017). These first two ways of characterizing microbiomes are often closely related: 
compositional characterizations of microbiomes that focus on genes to identify microbial taxa 
also allow functional inferences about the metabolic and other biochemical pathways these taxa 
might possess.  
In addition to compositional and functional characterizations of the microbiome, many 
researchers use what could be called an outcome-oriented characterization. This occurs most 
obviously in discussions of ‘dysbiosis’, which is defined as a microbiome state that produces 
disease states in the host-microbiome system (see Hooks and O’Malley 2017). Because of the 
interactions between host and microbiome, the state of the latter is frequently characterized in 
terms of the host state: a dysbiotic microbiome is stipulated to be the microbiome composition 
found in diseased hosts, such as those with cancer (e.g., Schwabe and Jobin 2013). In these 
cases, the causal characterization of the microbiome becomes trivially circular in explaining 
those ‘dysbiotic’ states. In other words, the dysbiotic nature of the microbiome is inferred from 
the disease, and the disease is explained by the dysbiotic microbiome. If a mechanism is 






speculated on, it is often framed in terms of ‘imbalance’, with an imbalanced microbiome 
thought to be causally productive of disease (e.g., Round and Mazmanian 2009). This kind of 
characterization can also be done the other way, for ‘healthy’ microbiomes. Terms such as 
‘homeostasis’ are applied to microbiomes associated with healthy host states (e.g., Schwabe and 
Jobin 2013). This positive outcome-oriented characterization is even looser than dysbiosis 
claims, because health is simply the absence of any disease when such terms are used. 
Increasingly, a fourth characterization of the microbiome is used, which we call the ‘causal 
core’ microbiome. Researchers began discussing core microbiomes compositionally, in terms of 
taxa shared by all healthy humans (e.g., Hamady & Knight 2009; Turnbaugh et al. 2009). It was 
hoped this would allow diagnosis and treatment to circumvent the high inter-individual 
variability of microbiomes. However, this taxonomic core proved elusive, unless identified at 
very coarse levels (e.g., phyla), and even then, the quantities of organisms in such ‘core’ taxa 
varied massively between different hosts or across studies (Lloyd-Price et al. 2016). 
Consequently, some researchers have attempted to discuss the causality of microbiomes in terms 
of key functions (e.g., metabolic pathways), but whole microbiomes are not well characterized 
functionally. One solution has been to pick out a few ‘core’ members that are known or can be 
shown to be doing something causally (e.g., Surana and Kasper 2017; Neville et al. 2018). 
Determining the causal-functional contribution of this subgroup means that only some of the 
microbiome is considered causally efficacious for a particular host state. 
These four perspectives show that microbiome descriptions are conceptually heterogeneous. 
Some researchers assume a compositional account, some a functional account, some an 
outcome-oriented approach, while yet others focus on a causally relevant ‘core’. Single research 
papers often combine two or more of these concepts when discussing microbiome causality, 
such as when a ‘causal core’ microbiome co-explains obesity with a dysbiotic (‘outcome-
oriented’) microbiome (e.g., Truax et al. 2018). Often, even when researchers refer to a whole 
microbiome (compositional or functional), they really appear to have in mind just a few 
members with a particular causal role (‘causal core’). Furthermore, microbiome composition 
varies both across individual hosts and within individual hosts over time, so even when a single 
way of characterizing the microbiome is accepted, it does not refer to a fixed or invariable 
causal agent. This range of different ways to conceptualise microbiomes is entangled with a 
range of causal claims about microbiomes. We show how the explanatory problems multiply in 
the two cases that follow. 
 
Microbiomes and obesity  
A microbiome association with obesity was initially discussed compositionally in terms of 
differences in the ratios of two phyla (a very coarse taxonomic level, indicated by DNA 
sequence). These relative compositions appeared to predict obesity reliably in hosts (Ley et al. 
2006; Turnbaugh et al. 2009). When mice or human gut microbiomes were found to have more 
Firmicutes than Bacteroidetes (the two main phyla in human and mouse guts), the hosts were 
very likely to be overweight; conversely, if the microbiomes had more Bacteroidetes, the hosts 
were likely to be leaner. In a human-based manipulation of these findings, obese humans who 
lost weight by dieting also lost their over-representation of Firmicutes (Ley et al. 2006). 
Findings like these stimulated an experimental regime to test the inferred causality of 
microbiome-host relationships. The gold standard of experimental techniques quickly became 
microbiome transplants from conventionally colonized mice with one phenotype (lean or obese) 
to germ-free mice. Germ-free mice are born in sterile laboratory environments and live their 
lives without microbiomes until they are experimentally colonized. The absence of a 






microbiome is to ensure a microbiome transplant is not confounded with effects from the native 
microbiome. When germ-free mice receive the transplant, almost always from donor faeces 
(called a faecal microbiome transplant or FMT), several key studies found the donor phenotype 
of obesity also transferred (Turnbaugh et al. 2008; 2009). Germ-free mice that received 
microbiomes from obese mice became obese, and germ-free mice that received microbiomes 
from lean mice remained lean (their typical condition). One study has explicitly demonstrated 
the transferability of a lean phenotype from a whole microbiome, to mice in a particular post-
surgical condition (Liou et al. 2013).  
Transfer-of-phenotype FMT experiments also succeeded from obese humans to mice, with the 
same effects (e.g., Turnbaugh et al. 2009). Even when human twin samples were used, to 
remove genetic confounding on the host side, obese phenotypes successfully transferred to the 
mice via human faeces (Ridaura et al. 2013). One human-mouse study transferred a single 
bacterial species from a human microbiome to decrease weight in mice (Goodrich et al. 2014a). 
In all these cases of phenotype transfer, say researchers, ‘the microbiome is considered causal’ 
(Goodrich et al. 2014b:250; see also Harley & Karp 2012).  
 
Challenges for microbiome explanations of obesity 
However, even in what appears to be a strong causal relationship between microbiomes and 
obesity, the causal direction cannot be determined due to confounds. For example, Ley et al. 
(2006) found that obese individuals who lost weight on a diet also lost their over-representation 
of Firmicutes. In this case, diet may be a common cause of both obesity and microbiome state, 
rather than the microbiome being the primary cause of obesity via direct mechanisms 
(Hildebrandt et al. 2009).   
The putative causal relationship also appears to be highly unstable. When the background factor 
of diet is manipulated and germ-free mice are put on low-fat diets, obesity FMTs fail (Ridaura et 
al. 2013). Additionally, manipulations of diet in germ-free mice have shown that the absence of 
a microbiome does not prevent weight gain on a high-fat diet (Fleissner et al. 2010). This means 
that the causal relationship between microbiomes and weight is only maintained under certain 
background conditions, thus scoring low on the stability dimension. As well, germ-free mice 
have many abnormalities that make extrapolating effects on them to other mice and humans 
very problematic, even when the mice receive FMTs from humans (Nguyen et al. 2015). Causal 
relationships in germ-free mice between microbiomes and phenotypes such as obesity are not, 
therefore, necessarily indicative of a more general, stable causal relationship between 
microbiomes and these phenotypes in other organisms, or even within healthy colonized mice.  
Further indications of instability are found in the association literature. Systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses show that changed phyla proportions or decreased diversity in the microbiome 
are not robust predictors of obesity in humans. Both increases and decreases of the key phylum 
Firmicutes have now been associated with obesity (e.g., Sze and Schloss 2016; Duvallet et al. 
2017), which suggests that as well as the causal structure being unclear, any causal relationship 
between microbiomes and obesity is sensitive to changes in background conditions.   
Specificity in the microbiome-obesity relationship is also undermined by the way microbiome 
effects are conceptualized. Recall that for the first sense of specificity (see Box 1), different 
states of a cause permit fine-grained control over its effect’s states, so that varying the cause 
results in corresponding variation in its effect. However, the effects of leanness and obesity are 
quantitative traits occurring along a continuum. Although cut-off criteria allow individuals to be 
classified into groups related to these traits, individuals do not exist in the world as either obese 
or lean. Nevertheless, microbiome research classifies these phenotypes as binary states (obese 






versus lean). The clearest experiments on germ-free mice affect only these crude phenotypic 
classifications, and very rarely induce leanness. This kind of descriptive coarseness also occurs 
when ‘dysbiosis’ is postulated. Microbiomes are treated as if they occur in one of two states: 
healthy or dysbiotic (disease-producing). Binary categorizations such as these suggest that 
although microbiomes may be causally implicated in a trait like obesity, the known specificity 
of the microbiome on the categorized trait is low (Duvallet et al. 2017).  
A more specific causal relationship would allow finely tuned manipulations of the microbiome 
to have similarly precise effects on the host phenotype. For example, more of a certain kind of 
bacteria would lead to a heavier host. Newer microbiome research is in fact attempting to find 
very specific groups of bacteria that have causal effects on obesity (e.g., Truax et al. 2018). 
However, if only some taxa are causally relevant (the ‘causal core’ concept), this makes the 
notion of a whole microbiome as a causal entity disproportionately broad. FMTs involve 
transfers of the entire gut community, and thus invoke the idea of the whole microbiome 
(conceptualized compositionally, functionally, or both) as the causal agent. But in any situation 
where the microbiome might cause anything, researchers could be referring to one or more of 
the four microbiome concepts identified above. Further exacerbating this representation 
problem, FMT manipulations are usually performed with whatever members of the community 
emerge in faeces, even though faecal microbiomes are known to be different from gut 
microbiomes (Momozawa et al. 2011). FMTs also include viruses, Archaea and eukaryotic 
microbes, but most microbiome studies make causal claims about only bacteria (admittedly the 
most abundant type of microorganism in the gut, apart from viruses). 
These problems indicate a failure of proportionality in characterizing the causes of observed 
effects in obesity and other FMT studies. When considering the second sense of proportionality 
(Box 1), an FMT manipulation that changes only a few elements of the microbiome 
composition, rather than the microbiome as a whole, would be more appropriately described as 
an intervention on particular bacterial taxa. It is these focal bacteria that cause the disease state 
observed, rather than the (whole) microbiome. This is the finding of work that implicates a 
single family of gut bacteria in the prevention of obesity (Truax et al. 2018). Even though the 
authors claim this focal subgroup ameliorates ‘dysbiosis’, their intervention manipulates only 
one particular subset of the microbiome, and even more proximally focuses on a certain anti-
inflammatory protein produced by these (and other) bacteria. 
In general, the causal components of microbiomes are not known. When causality is attributed 
to any microbiome, it often serves merely to signal that ‘something’ in the microbiome is causal. 
For instance, Grinspan and Kelly (2015:17), when discussing colitis, observe that the results 
from FMT experiments ‘suggest that FMT is a heterogeneous treatment, and the effect may be 
donor dependent … we still do not understand the active component of FMT. Is it a bacteria or 
bacterial metabolite, or is it the interaction between microbial and host factors?’ 
Invoking the whole microbiome (compositionally or functionally) as a causal agent seldom if 
ever achieves the right level of explanation or the most appropriate causal description for many 
microbiome findings. As an illustration, the association between microbiome composition and 
obesity suggests that the relative compositions of Firmicutes and Bacteroidetes are responsible 
for obesity effects. Explanatorily, phyla ratios would indicate that small-scale characteristics of 
the microbiome (e.g., smaller taxonomic groups or particular metabolic functions) are causally 
insufficient for such effects. The unlikeliness of that being true suggests that the Firmicutes-
Bacteroidetes causal description is too restricted (to phyla ratios only), and thus disproportional. 
Conversely, if microbiomes are described too broadly, then they include numerous elements that 
are irrelevant to the production of the focal effect (Mithieux 2018). To overcome the 
proportionality problem, a growing number of microbiome studies now home in on much 
smaller groups of organisms as causal agents in a community context, akin to the ‘causal core’ 






concept. Indeed, advocacy for more ‘reductionist’ causal ascriptions is ramping up in 
microbiome research (e.g., Fischbach 2018).  
 
Microbiomes and mental health 
The obesity transfer-of-phenotype experiments via FMT became ‘proof of principle’ for 
showing causal relationships in microbiome research. This methodological template inspired 
researchers in other fields to seek causal connections between microbiomes and other bodily 
states, notably brain functions and behaviours. Using the language of ‘gut-brain axis’ (a known 
but poorly understood connection), increasing numbers of studies have tested the involvement of 
microbiomes in both psychiatric disorders and general brain states. In these experiments, germ-
free and other mice are again the main experimental systems. However, the main manipulation 
in this subfield of microbiome research is not whole microbiome transfers, but instead the 
administration of probiotics (living microorganisms, usually just a few strains or species) to the 
mouse gut, to see if this changes the brain or behaviour.  
Anxiety and depression are key targets of these probiotic manipulations, with reports of less 
depression-related and anxiety-like behaviour in mice receiving probiotics (e.g., Bravo et al. 
2011). These behaviours are measured by performance on classic mice-testing devices that 
involve measurable responses to environments. Once behavioural differences are found between 
probiotic and control groups, mechanisms may be postulated. For example, microbial 
metabolites are suggested to be ‘acting directly on the brain’ (Collins et al. 2013:241), or to have 
indirect effects on host production of neurochemicals.  
A modest amount of brain-behaviour microbiome research does manipulate whole microbiomes 
via FMT instead of using probiotics. One study famously showed that FMTs from a ‘bolder’ 
strain of mice into the guts of ‘timid’ strains made the timid mice bolder (Bercik et al. 2011). 
Depression-associated symptoms have also been transferred via FMT from depressed humans to 
antibiotic-treated rats (who thus have a ‘depleted’ microbiome), and this finding is suggested to 
provide ‘definitive evidence’ of a causal relationship between microbiomes and mental health 
(Kelly et al. 2016:115). 
FMTs are believed to change the overall microbiome composition. Probiotics are also suggested 
to induce positive changes in the community of gut microorganisms, and these broad 
compositional or functional states are often argued to be the causal agents of phenotypic change 
(e.g., Arnold et al. 2016). This level of explanation focuses on the whole community, rather than 
the probiotics themselves or any key taxonomic groups in the FMT. These changes might be 
described as a simple shift in the relative proportions of taxonomic groups of microorganisms in 
the community, or as a movement toward a ‘normal’ community composition (e.g., Ait-
Belgnaoui et al. 2012).  
 
Challenges for microbiome explanations of mental health 
Just as in the obesity case, the very structure of causality is problematic in this field. In many of 
the experiments linking microbiomes to mental health, no direct manipulation of the 
microbiome has been conducted. Probiotics are the intervention. Even if probiotics have effects, 
their relationship to the microbiome is unclear. Although there is some evidence of positive 
probiotic effects in mice, there is much less such evidence in humans (Wang et al. 2016). 
Crucially, probiotic manipulations that appear to produce behavioural outcomes in mice do not 
produce them in humans (Kelly et al. 2017). Further complications come from research that 
shows probiotics do not reliably colonize mice intestines (Zmora et al. 2018). Even when 






behavioural effects do apparently occur after probiotic treatment of humans, there may be no 
concomitant changes to their microbiomes after probiotic administration (Kristensen et al. 
2016). In other words, the probiotics could be acting as a common cause of changes to the 
microbiome as well as the measured behavioural outcome, or they may influence the outcome 
directly without any mediation via the microbiome.  
Other studies that manipulate the microbiome more extensively, by carrying out microbiome 
manipulations with FMTs, also present the common cause problem. FMTs probably cause 
outcomes via a range of causal pathways. This possibility is addressed by studies that provide 
placebo interventions alongside FMTs in randomized controlled trials (e.g., Moayyedi et al. 
2015), but many FMT experiments are not so stringent. Some studies try to avoid the 
‘confounding influences’ of germ-free mice and their atypical physiology and brains by instead 
using rodents with microbiomes that have been depleted by antibiotic treatments (e.g., Kelly et 
al. 2016).  However, this strategy introduces a different kind of causal background variable: 
antibiotic treatment, which is well known to decrease compositional diversity. Many 
microbiome studies suggest that antibiotic-depleted microbiomes are causally related to disease 
symptoms (e.g., Cox et al. 2014). Using antibiotic treatments as a proxy for germ-free status 
thereby introduces another confound. 
In addition to an unclear causal structure, there are problems in the proportionality of causal 
claims made about the microbiome and mental health states. Experiments using probiotics 
involve at most a few strains of organism, often classic milk-fermenting microorganisms such as 
lactobacilli. A manipulation involving probiotics might alter a specific subset of the microbiome 
of an organism (i.e., a ‘causal core’ microbiome), or it may bring about widespread changes to 
the community composition (the compositional microbiome). However, probiotics may also 
cause no changes in the microbiome composition at all (e.g., Kristensen et al. 2016), in which 
case any putative effect on host brain or behaviour might be a direct effect of the probiotics, or 
might be due to probiotics changing some other factor. As in the obesity case, this issue points 
to a problem with the proportionality of the causal explanation. In experiments administering 
probiotics, it is not appropriate to make causal claims about the entire microbiome, because 
these statements describe the cause too broadly and include information not related to the 
intervention.  
As well as the more general worry of which microbiome concept is being invoked (related to 
issues with Proportionality [2] in Box 1), these studies are subject to problems with 
proportionality in the first sense, which focuses on how variables along a causal chain are 
selected as the most relevant causes or effects. We noted above that most causal claims about 
microbiomes influencing anxiety and depression are not based on observations of depressed or 
anxious humans. Instead they refer to rodent behaviour on standardized testing devices. For 
instance, tests of ‘anxiety-like’ behaviours measure the exploratory tendencies of rodents in 
different states (e.g., germ-free, FMT recipients, or probiotic recipients), while tests of 
‘depression-like’ behaviours often focus on factors such as the amount of time spent swimming 
versus floating in a beaker of water. Even if we assume a meaningful mapping for anxiety and 
depression between rodents and humans (problematic in its own right), these studies do not 
measure the effect variables ‘depression’ and ‘anxiety’. They measure rough behavioural 
proxies of these states. Although in animal studies (including those of humans) it is not possible 
to measure psychological states directly, in human psychological research it is at least possible 
to collect self-reports of participant mental states. Self-reports provide more proportional 
evidence for claims about mental states, because they are at least reflective of the states 
themselves, whereas proxy behaviours may occur downstream from the mental states along a 
causal chain. In rodents there are also many questions about how adequately such tests measure 
anything to do with genuine anxiety or depression states. These are standard worries for rodent-






based research, but they are compounded by the problems we have already noted about 
microbiome variables and causal structure.  
Relatedly, depression and anxiety are not binary variables with on-off states, as discussed in 
relation to the variables of obesity and leanness. Yet what the interventions focus on is anxiety 
versus non-anxiety-like behaviours, and depression versus non-depression-like behaviours. As 
we noted for obesity, with only binary effect measures, the specificity of the cause and effect 
relationship is low. 
For the second sense of specificity, approximating one-to-one mapping in mental health and 
other microbiome research is simply not possible given the breadth of phenotypes believed to be 
causally influenced by microbiomes. These include diabetes, hypertension, numerous cancers, 
intestinal diseases, liver diseases, immune disorders, multiple sclerosis, asthma and other 
respiratory diseases, erectile dysfunction, autism and other neurodevelopmental disorders, 
neurological conditions, migraines, dermatitis, halitosis, vision loss, and unhealthy ageing (see 
Gilbert et al. 2016). This proliferation of disease effects leads to a failure of specificity of the 
cause, in much the same way that ‘immune response’ fails specificity of the cause in 
explanations of ulcer formation. Regarding specificity of the effect, traits in which the 
microbiome is implicated (i.e., obesity or mental health disorders) have for a long time been 
understood as multi-factorial, with a range of causal contributions (e.g., Reich et al. 1975; 
Grundy 1998). Microbiome relationships to such disorders will not, therefore, meet specificity 
of effect criteria—even assuming it is clear what precisely ‘the microbiome’ is, and whether or 
not it is being intervened on. As we showed above, often it is not. 
 
Reconstructing microbiome explanations 
We have argued that explanations in contemporary microbiome research face a number of 
problems. Explanations are presented as causally linking the microbiome to particular human 
health or disease states. But they often fail to establish causality, to intervene on the microbiome 
itself, or to converge on a consistent understanding of precisely what the microbiome is in the 
first place. Causal explanations often seem disproportionate, to hold only under certain kinds of 
background conditions (instability), and to have low specificity. Although some of these 
problems also beset well-established microbiological explanations (e.g., the case of H. pylori 
and ulcers), they are especially relevant in new fields seeking to establish their causal credentials 
and treatment potential, such as microbiome research. Issues surrounding the proportionality of 
causal explanations appear to be particularly problematic in microbiome research, due to the 
scale of whole microbial communities, and the heterogeneity of ways to conceptualize the 
microbiome itself.  
Microbiome researchers generally agree that better causal explanations are precisely what the 
field needs now to make progress (e.g., Fischbach 2018). How might clearer and stronger causal 
explanations be achieved? We answer this question by way of a microbiome success story that 
not only produces a treatment but also leads back to Koch’s postulates. 
 
C. difficile and Koch’s postulates 
It is well-known that FMTs ameliorate the effects of a particularly nasty pathogen in the gut, 
Clostridium difficile. Administering an FMT, from almost any healthy donor, consistently 
overcomes the debilitating disease effects induced by C. difficile infections (van Nood et al. 
2013). Being able to cure C. difficile robustly with FMTs indicates the stability of the causal 
relationship between FMTs and C. difficile. In other words, the causal relationship persists 






across many different background conditions (individuals and populations). This success has 
often been interpreted as evidence in favour of the whole microbiome being causally efficacious 
in curing C. difficile. But does this treatment indicate specificity and proportionality? 
Recently, a few studies have decomposed FMTs to the members that are most causally potent 
against C. difficile. These studies identify which microorganisms play the strongest causal roles, 
and the particular pathways involved (e.g., Stein et al. 2013; Buffie et al. 2015). In other words, 
the earlier ‘lumping’ of the causal factors into one of the broader microbiome concepts (such as 
a functional or compositional account) is overcome by fine-tuning a broad cause to a much 
narrower complement of causal factors. Although some researchers claim this is still a whole 
microbiome explanation, because the FMT has altered the niche of the microbiome (e.g., 
Lawley & Walker 2013), an interventionist framework suggests that the most proportionate 
causal explanation involves a small subgroup of the microbiome. Niche modification refers to 
the causal background. Factors in the background have no immediate difference-making effects 
and thus are not part of the central explanatory variable, which is the ‘causal core’ microbiome. 
The microbiome captured by this ‘causal core’ sense is both a specific explanation of C. difficile 
amelioration (in the one-to-one mapping sense of specificity), as well as the most proportional 
explanation for C. difficile cures.  
This example of microbiome research provides a good causal explanation because a restricted 
number of bacterial components explain C. difficile cures. The success of this strategy should 
come as no surprise, because it is a relatively proximal cause. More proximal causal 
relationships often provide better causal explanations due to proximity increasing both stability 
and specificity. In contrast, recent findings that dietary manipulations can suppress C. difficile 
(Hryckowian et al. 2018) rely on the notion that diet fosters ‘anti-dysbiotic’ microbial 
communities that somehow inhibit C. difficile. This account depends on less proximate and less 
defined causal relationships. Although we do not dispute that coarse-grained interventions can 
often have useful effects (e.g., diet, antibiotics),10 there is less explanatory strength according to 
the interventionist dimensions embedded in many scientific explanations. 
One approach to better causal explanations in human microbiome research would, therefore, be 
to identify more proximal causal relationships between the microbiome and phenotypes such as 
metabolic pathways. Another would be to decompose the microbiome into component parts that 
can be understood independently (at least initially) as would occur with Koch’s postulates. 
However, as we have seen in the Helicobacter case, Koch’s postulates are not always achieved, 
and yet still a causal explanation is deemed to exist especially if it produces an effective 
treatment via intervention. The C. difficile story, however, shows that invoking the whole 
microbiome (via FMTs) leads to a failure of proportionality and specificity, and yet a very stable 
treatment. As well as indicating that successful treatments may not be aligned with the best 
causal explanation, this case suggests that more philosophical work needs to be done to 
understand the trade-offs between causal specificity, proportionality, and stability.  
An ecological version of Koch’s postulates in microbiome research has been touted as an 
alternative to the traditional single-microbe Koch’s postulates (Vonaesch et al. 2018). However, 
this ecological version simply distributes all causality across the whole microbiome, and thus 
reinforces the proportionality problem. Should we think of microbiome effects as emergent, and 
that such emergent features are ‘wholly unpredictable from observations of components’ of the 
microbiome (Hall et al. 2018:979-980)? Right now, claims about the causal role of emergent 
microbiome properties are simply acknowledging that far too little is known about microbiome 
components and their interactions. Even if such claims eventually find more evidential support, 
                                               
10 This is generally due to pragmatic factors such as ease of intervention. While diet may be a distal cause, it is 
often easier to manipulate compared to more proximate physiological factors.  






the same interventionist dimensions of explanation should be brought to bear. Such dimensions 
could be additionally helpful when there appear to be competing levels of microbiome 




Much of the enthusiasm for microbiome research is based on its capacity to provide a 
‘revolutionary’ methodological, conceptual and explanatory alternative to traditional 
microbiology (e.g., Cho and Blaser 2012). Experimental evidence such as we outline above 
suggests there is something causal going on in microbiome research. Manipulations are made, 
and effects are produced often enough to be deemed reliable. But the exact nature of the causal 
relationships, and the explanatory credence that should be given to causal claims about the 
microbiome, are not well worked out. There are numerous weaknesses in causal inferences from 
experimental microbiome research.  
The way in which the microbiome itself is conceptualized and described differs between (and 
sometimes within) studies. Compositional and functional accounts of whole microbiomes 
describe causes too broadly, and target phenotypes such as behavioural measures in mice are 
often described inexactly, meaning that causal explanations are commonly disproportionate to 
their effects. The coarse-grained or binary descriptions of outcomes such as obesity, leanness, 
depression and anxiety limit the degree of causal specificity in microbiome causal explanations. 
Proposed causal relationships are potentially confounded by common causes, which in many 
instances could be due to the experimental manipulation itself (i.e., probiotic administration). 
Well-accepted causal relationships (i.e., microbiome composition and obesity) display relatively 
low degrees of stability across populations and species, which could account for problems in the 
replicability of microbiome research.  
But despite the recent identification of a narrower causal basis in the FMT treatment of C. 
difficile, this explanatory strategy may not hold for many other outcomes influenced by the 
microbiome. Explaining obesity, depression, and anxiety by microbiomes is much harder than 
explaining how a single (albeit dire) infection can be controlled by elements of the microbiome. 
All of the former are complex multifactorial traits that have heritable components, and are not 
likely to be captured by the identification of a few proximal pathways. The multi-causal nature 
of these traits makes it likely that there are many interactions between numerous components of 
the microbiome, the host, and their environments. It is for this reason that one-to-one specificity 
is not possible for whole microbiome explanations, and it also suggests that the causal influence 
of the microbiome as a whole would be extremely unstable, and difficult to isolate 
experimentally. Current research already indicates this to be the case. Given these limitations, it 
might be most productive to focus causal explanations on specific microbiome components, and 
to limit causal explanations to more proportional descriptions of behaviour, rather than complex 
human traits such as mental health states. But even if complex multi-causal traits challenge an 
interventionist causal-explanatory framework, its tools can be useful for isolating and evaluating 
multiple important contributing causes (Ross 2018). 
Establishing causation is not easy, and microbiome research is not unique in facing the 
challenges we outline. To end on a positive note, what kinds of explanatory and other claims can 
or should be made, given microbiome complexities? Our microbiome cases, and their 
comparison with the H. pylori explanation, show there are two avenues by which explanatory 
problems can be addressed: more explicit conceptualization of the focal causal entity, and more 
precise assessment of the dimensions of causal explanation.  






Our discussion suggests avenues for clearer communication about the focal causal entity. First, 
there is the matter of whether the whole microbiome, as a unitary causal entity, is the proper 
explanatory focus. We have questioned its role as such, at least in many cases of microbiome 
research to date. First, interventions such as FMTs and probiotics do not convincingly support 
the inference that the whole microbiome has been intervened on, and second, there are not yet 
any strong reasons to think that ‘emergent’ properties of the whole microbiome play a causal 
role. Even if these properties are eventually identified, specifying what is meant by ‘the 
microbiome’ is always a good starting point for better causal explanations. Our four ways to 
characterize the microbiome could help: if it is clear which aspect of the microbiome is at stake 
in a given study—its composition, function, outcome, or causal ‘core’, or some conjunction of 
these—it will be easier to tell when researchers are talking about the same causal agent.  
We realize that at least sometimes researchers target ‘the microbiome’ without commitment to 
its status as a unitary causal entity. Rather, this phrase is used as a placeholder for a black-boxed 
subgroup of human microbiota: some to-be-defined microbial taxa or their biochemical 
pathways. To the extent that this is the case, explicit articulation of that black-boxing would 
appropriately shift the focus and facilitate clearer causal explanations. Perhaps in some instances 
researchers talk about the microbiome in this way because broad microbiome claims are 
heuristically valuable, especially in exploratory studies of new candidate microbiome effects. 
Even if this is the intention, clearer articulation of background assumptions would be 
productive. In particular, conceptual precision requires identifying whether whole microbiomes 
are causally salient, as opposed to some focal subgroup of the community. 
Finally, the second avenue for addressing explanatory complexities in microbiome research is to 
assess more precisely the dimensions of causal explanation, and communicate more carefully 
the extent to which a successful causal explanation has been achieved. If microbiome 
researchers continue to investigate complex traits, whatever their understanding of ‘the 
microbiome’, these investigations will benefit from evaluating how prospective explanations 
rank on the dimensions of stability, specificity, and proportionality. Bearing these dimensions in 
mind may also help microbiome research to develop additional methods for achieving causal 
explanations of human health and mental states. 
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